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Designing A Successful Voluntary Green Support Program:  
What Do We Know?
By Sandra S. Batie
1
Introduction
The current debate surrounding the reauthorization of the omnibus
farm legislation has refocused policy makers' attention on an
expanding set of public goals envisioned for the Farm Bill. 
Whereas early Farm Bills mainly addressed farm income goals,
recent Farm Bills have given an increasing amount of attention to
environmental quality concerns.  For example, the 1985 Farm Bill,
(The 1985 Food Security Act), created the Conservation Reserve
Program which explicitly addressed soil erosion and water quality
problems as did the "Swampbuster", "Sodbuster" and Conservation-
Compliance provisions in the same Act.  The 1990 Farm Bill, (The
1990 Food, Conservation and Trade Act) added additional
environmentally-oriented programs:  the Wetland Reserve Program,
the Water Quality Incentives Program, and the Integrated Farm
Management Program.
At the same time, there has been a proliferation of local, state,
and federal legislation addressing agriculture's nonpoint
pollution problems and natural resource protection.  This2
legislation has catalyzed public debates on inconsistent
legislative "signals" to producers, the number and fragmentation
of programs, as well as the public and private costs of
compliance.  These debates have resurfaced the concept of Green
Support Programs (GSPs).  Attractive in principle, a GSP is based
on the pursuit of two public goals--(1) farm income support and
(2) environmental protection--with one policy instrument.  The
policy instrument is the provision of monetary payments to
producers who pursue some environmental goal.  The basic concept
is not new, but is refined in current discussions by
consideration of a GSP designed to obtain more environmental
quality per program dollar than has been the case in the past.
Refinement of the GSP concept is possible because there is now
data that can serve as indicators of the location, nature, and
magnitude of environmental problems (Heimlich, 1994).  The data
show that the character of nonpoint environmental problems differ
in source and impact, and that these problems are unevenly
distributed throughout the nation.  That is, the problems of
confined animal waste pollution of water in some counties in
Pennsylvania differ from the problems of nitrate pollution of
groundwater from crops in some counties of Nebraska, which differ
from the problems of air pollution due to wind erosion of exposed
cropland in some counties in Texas, which differ from the
problems of chemical and toxic contamination of reservoirs in3
some counties in California.  Some regions have severe
agricultural-related environmental problems; others do not.
Having data available means that, now, more than ever before,
program managers can identify and target payments to those
producers who could improve environmental quality the most, if
they were to change their farming systems or farming practices. 
These producers may not necessarily be the same ones currently
receiving farm income support payments, however.  Thus the
politically acceptable design of a GSP is quite complex (Lynch
and Smith, 1994).
Even if the difficulties of the political acceptability of a GSP
were revolved, however, there still remains additional
complexities.  If agencies were to use existing data to target
priority watersheds or airsheds with significant nonpoint
pollution problems, as well as to target priority farms within
these priority watersheds and airsheds, are there viable
solutions for producers who are participating within a voluntary
GSP?  Questions to be addressed in the remainder of this paper
include:
$ Do farm-level "solutions" to non-point environmental
problems exist?
$ What factors will cause farm-level "solutions" to be
implemented by producers on targeted farms within
targeted watersheds or airsheds?4
The design of a truly successful voluntary green support program
will require careful attention to  these questions.  Presumably,
the goals of a GSP are to improve environmental quality by
changing  farming systems without handicapping the
competitiveness of American agriculture in a global economy.  A
voluntary program must therefore be seen by producers as a viable
choice, given producers' resources, farm characteristics,
attitudes, and constraints.  There must be alternative
technologies available to the producer, and these technologies
must be used in such a way and on such farms that environmental
quality is actually improved.  
Thus, a successful voluntary GSP must identify and target the
location of environmental quality problems related to
agricultural uses of the land.  Technologies and information must
be available that improve the situation.  Producers must be
persuaded to voluntarily adopt these systems or practices.  
This study will address the latter two components: agricultural
technologies to improve environmental quality and the voluntary
adoption of these technologies. 
Do Technologies and Information Exist for Farm-Level
Improvement of Nonpoint Pollution Problems?
A successful voluntary GSP will need to identify which
alternative farming systems (or practices) meet both the criteria5
for general profitability (perhaps with a modest green support
payment) as well as for the improvement of environmental quality. 
Put succinctly, a successful GSP needs to identify the practices
and systems that are represented by intersection C of the Venn
Diagram representation in Figure 1.    
Figure 1.   Technology and Information Choices
Plans versus Practices
Agricultural practices and farming systems represented by
intersection C in the Venn diagram can differ for different farm     
2While there are differing advantages and disadvantages that
come with using different whole-farm-plan providers, I will not
address these issues in this paper.  For a discussion of some of
these issues see Wolf and Nowak (1994).
6
situations.  Thus, while it is tempting to focus a GSP toward the
adoption of single, individual farming practices such as a Best
Management Practice (BMP), it is not ideal.  Not only are
producers, farms, and regions diverse, so that individual
practices are not suitable for every situation, there are also
many inherent linkages between soil quality, the use of inputs,
and the impact on the environment and profits.  As a result, more
environmental quality will be obtained by more careful tailoring
GSP supported farming systems or practices to individual farms. 
However such a tailored approach does increase program complexity
and implementation costs.  
One approach might be for a GSP to require a whole farm plan of
participants in lieu of implementing BMPs from which GSP farmers
can select.  Such a plan could incorporate an analysis of the
linkages between soil quality, input use, profits and
environmental quality and could be provided by federal, state or
local public agencies (e.g., Soil Conservation Service, State
Departments of Natural Resources, Cooperative Extension Service),
by private consultants, or as an additional service from
agricultural input dealers.
2  A flexible, farming systems
analysis that recognizes these linkages can result in the
identification of a lower cost, more effective solution to an     
3 A farming system analysis "comprises the pattern and
sequence of crops in space and time, the management decisions
regarding the inputs and production practices that are used, the
management skills, education, and objectives of the producer, the
quality of the soil and water, and the nature of the landscape
and ecosystem within which agricultural production occurs"
(National Research Council, 1993, pp 106-107).
     
4If the most profits and the most environmental protection
possible is to be obtained from an agricultural system, a
producer must not only be informed about the relationships
between agricultural and environmental systems but also possess
good management skills. The careful use of this information in
farming has been referred to as "high precision farming" (Munson
and Runge, 1990).  Such high precision farming can include
alternative agricultural practices within the farm system.
7
environmental problem than can the dictation of a BMP which
addresses only one aspect of the farm.
3 
The planning process itself can also be the source of valuable
information for the producer with respect to environmental
quality impacts of various farm management decisions.
4  A farming
system analysis can also highlight tradeoffs between alternative
practices.  For example, the reduction of phosphorus in sediment
can lead to an increase of phosphorus in the soluble form; the
use of rotations can reduce profits;  reducing pesticide runoff
can increase pesticide leaching; or the reduction in stream
sediment can decrease stream channel stability.  A farming system
analysis, where tradeoffs in farm related environmental problems
are identified, can result in better choices.8
Dynamic Relationships
It is also important to realize that the Venn diagram in Figure 1
is dynamic.  First, the very logic of a GSP is to use payments to
enlarge intersection C of both profitable and environment
protecting farming practices and systems.  That is, a GSP might
provide payments for farming practices that are not profitable
from a producer's perspective but will yield significant
environmental quality benefits.
In addition, the intersection C can expand overtime as the
research community increases its focus on the environmental
quality impacts of agriculture.  Traditionally, agricultural
research has focused mainly on increasing the quantity of output,
such as crop yields.  More recently, there has been increased
research attention to reducing the amount of chemical inputs and
to the reduction of soil erosion.  The result has been more
technologies that are both environmentally protecting and which
maintain the competitiveness of US agriculture.  Integrated Pest
Management is an example of such a research effort; as are many
technologies that have been termed "alternative agriculture"
technologies.
Are there currently enough technologies that are either both
profitable and environmentally protecting or which could be made
so with a modest GSP payment?  The answer appears to be "yes", at     
5Similar recommendations  have been made within other studies such as that of
the Office of Technology and Assessment (US Congress, 1990) or the Journal of
Soil and Water Conservation special supplement to the March-April 1994 issue. 
This supplement was entirely devoted to nutrient management.
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least in many cases.  A complete review of these technologies is
not possible in this brief overview; fortunately there is other
research to which one can refer.
A recently completed review of the science associated with
improving soil and water quality by the National Research Council
(1993) identified four fundamental principles for national policy
to improve soil and water quality as well as agricultural
practices and systems that could be used to  pursue the goals of
improved environmental quality.  Many of these would be either
profitable or low cost for many producers.
Fundamental Principles
The four principles for improving environmental quality from the
National Research Council report are:
National policy should seek to (1) conserve and enhance soil
quality as a fundamental first step to environmental
improvement; (2) increase the nutrient, pesticide, and
irrigation use efficiencies in farming systems; (3) increase
the resistance of farming systems to erosion and runoff; and
(4) make greater use of field and landscape buffer zones (p.
4).
The National Research Council report identified various changes
in farming practices that could be used to implement policy that
embraced the four principles
5.  For example, there is10
considerable evidence of excess nitrogen use (compared to plant
uptake) in many regions of the country.  Where there is excess
nitrogen, improved environmental quality could result from better
record keeping, proper accounting for sources of nitrogen, soil
testing, proper yield goals, and the synchronizing of nitrogen
application with crop needs.  Within a watershed, coordination
among farms and the use of whole farm nutrient management plans
could, in many cases, achieve a significant reduction in residual
nitrogen (National Research Council, 1993).
There is also evidence of excessive phosphorus in many soils. 
Yet additional phosphorus is sometimes applied, frequently as a
result of the spreading of manures.  Because phosphorus binds to
sediment, phosphorus loss can be reduced by reducing soil erosion
as well as by reducing applications.  Improved practices that may
be viable in some phosphorus rich regions include the use of
buffer strips, planting cover crops, storing or hauling of
manure, or planting a more diverse set of crops (National
Research Council, 1993).
Similarly, irrigation practices can be improved on some farms by
better water scheduling, optimal allocation rates, the reuse of
drainage waters and similar practice (National Research Council,
1993).11
The improved management of pesticides is also possible.  There is
no perfect pesticide--that is, one that adequately controls only
the target pest and then suddenly dissipates leaving no harmful
residuals in the environment (National Research Council, 1993).  
While many believe that American agriculture could reduce
pesticide use, the total elimination of pesticides in a short
period of time would cause major disruptions in the agriculture
sector (Gianessi, 1993).  These disruptions would result from the
lack of readily available substitutes and technologies for all
situations and enterprises (Gianessi, 1993). If the public goals
were to ultimately reduce pesticide use after a transition
period, however, the search for substitutes would focus research
attention on the development of alternative systems to a much
greater degree than has hitherto been the case.  Such long term
efforts to reduce the need for environmentally damaging
pesticides are the most promising approach to reducing
environmental damages from pesticides. (National Research
Council, 1993.  
While total elimination of pesticide use would be extremely
disruptive at this time, there currently are available
technologies, farming systems and farming practices that can
reduce pesticide losses to the environment for many types of
agricultural systems in many regions (National Research Council,
1993).  A GSP could focus attention on these situations and
encourage alternative systems that reduce pesticide use where12
there are pesticide pollution problems, particularly when a green
payment would make adoption of these practices and systems more
attractive to the producer.
The basic principles to be followed in reducing the use of
pesticides include:
- selection of proper pesticides and formulations;
- improved timing and application methods to minimize
drift and volatile losses;
- use of erosion and runoff control measures to reduce
losses through runoff and leaching;
- use of nonchemical pest control measures such as crop
rotations and management; and
- integrated pest management (which embodies most of the
recommended practices (cited above) National Research
Council, p. 329.
The Role for Alternative Agriculture
In some cases, the agricultural technologies and systems that
reduce chemical inputs and/or improve environmental quality are
classified as belonging to "alternative agriculture".  Although
sometimes the concept of alternative agriculture incorporates a
philosophy of being in "harmony with nature" (as opposed to the
more conventional "management of nature") (Batie and Taylor,13
1991), it more frequently refers to alternative practices or
alternative systems regardless of underlying philosophies. Indeed
many farms use neither totally conventional nor alternative
systems, but are more-or-less "conventional" or "alternative" in
their main tendencies (General Accounting Office, 1990).  Farmers
who adopt reduced input systems frequently do so to solve a
particular production, environmental, or health problem as
opposed to doing so for philosophical or ideological reasons
(Buttel, et. al, 1986).
The General Accounting Office report, Alternative Agriculture,
summarizes the differences between some conventional and
alternative practices as shown in Table 1) (General Accounting
Office, 1990, p. 32). While organic practices are considered
alternative agricultural practices since they use no purchased
chemical inputs, there are many practices that are low-chemical
but not organic.  These include practices that use diverse
rotations, biological pest control, or conservation tillage
methods.
Alternative agricultural practices are so-named because if, used
properly, they are more environmentally protecting than
conventional agricultural practices.  Much of the debate
surrounding widescale adoption of alternative agricultural
practices however does not relate to their environmental impacts,
rather, the debate relates to their profitability.14
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Source:  General Accounting Office, 1980, p. 32.
Profitability Factors Influencing Participation in a GSP
Agricultural practices and systems exist that are more
environmentally protecting than many current conventional
practices and systems.  But how many are profitable or could be
made profitable with a modest green support payment?  The
profitability of alternative agriculture has been long debated
(see for examples, Buttel, et. al., 1986; Council for     
6As Dobbs (1994) notes, however an important factor to
consider is whether a producer is adopting an alternative
practice such as a changed tillage method or whether a whole farm
system is being adopted that changes crop rotations and the
relationships between crops and livestock by, say, making
livestock rations more forage-based.  Dobbs predicts from his
research that whole system changes to more "sustainable" farming
systems would result in some decrease in profits, at the present
time, in high-output regions such as the Corn Belt.  However this
conclusion is specific to this agro-climatic region and
sustainable systems appear more competitive in predominantly
small-grain areas than in the Corn Belt.
15
Agricultural Science and Technology, 1990; Crosson and Ekey,
1988; Dobbs, 1993; Dobbs, 1994; Fox, et al, 1991; General
Accounting Office, 1990; Natural Resource Council, 1989; Tweeten,
1992).  A careful reading of the arguments and the evidence
suggest that there are alternative practices that do reduce
negative environmental impacts from conventional practices in
some, but not all, circumstances.  Some, but not all, are
profitable or relatively low cost.
6
The distinction between alternative and conventional agriculture
may not be as useful for the purposes of this paper as is the
distinction between which farming technologies and systems
provide both public and private benefits.
Return to Figure 1 and consider that those practices and systems
in Circle A--Competitive Agriculture--but not in the intersection
C are those that yield private profits but are not
environmentally protecting.  Similarly, those in Circle B--
Environmentally Protecting--but not in the intersection C are16
those that yield the public benefits of improved air and water
quality but are not profitable.  Those in intersection C yield
both private and public benefits (beyond a food supply).  
Pampel and van Es (1977) make the distinction between
technologies that are commercial innovations--that is those that
improve profits (i.e., in the portion of Circle A not in the
intersection) and those that are environmental innovations (i.e.,
in the portion of Circle B not in the intersection)--that is,
they have as a first objective the protection of an existing
natural resource.  The means and goals of these two types of
technologies are sufficiently different and imply different
adoption behaviors; and, they will also therefore imply different
GSP payment policies (Camboni, Napier and Lovejoy, 1990). 
One way to categorize farming systems in a manner that
encompasses this distinction between commercial and environmental
technologies is to adopt a producer's point of view of the
perceived outcome of adoption.  Will there be a positive private
outcome from adoption?  Whether the farming system is perceived
as a profitable system may not be the sole factor, but for many
producers it will be the dominate factor.  At the same time, the
perception of the adoption of the proposed farming system on a
desired public good such as environmental quality is important
too.  Where the producer perceives a positive outcome for both
himself (or herself) and the public, adoption will be more     
7Uncertainty surrounding the ultimate impact of adoption of different farming
systems and technology is an important barrier to participation in a GSP.  More
research is needed on the marginal economic impacts of alternative conservation
systems.  What is known needs to be better disseminated to producers.  See
Fletcher and Seitz (1986) for a detailed discussion of information needs for
conservation decisions from a producer's perspective.
17
readily forthcoming.  Furthermore, if the perceptions are
accurate, the system will remain in place (that is, there will be
no reason for the producer to abandon the new farming system and
return to former practices).  Perceptions  will also be weighted
by the producer in ways to account for uncertainty of outcome. 
The more uncertain the producer perceives the outcome, the more
likely will be the presumption that it will be negative
7.  Table
2 displays these categories in matrix form.
Win-Win
In the Table 2 matrix, the northwest cell identifies a farming
system (or a farming practice) that is termed "win-win".  That
is, the producer views the system to be profitable and to fit
within the acceptable range of other socio-economic constraints
and goals; the producer also perceives the system to produce
positive public environmental benefits.  An example might be a
nutrient management plan that both reduces the purchase and use
of commercial fertilizers, but does not negatively impact yields
(National Research Council, 1993).  For these types of systems,
voluntary, targeted GSP programs have great potential to change
behavior since the producer should have an incentive to adopt18
them. However, educational programs and transitional cost-sharing
may be required even in "win-win" situations.  The decision to
change behavior should be stable and continued cost sharing
should not be necessary to maintain the system or practice.  























There are models of promising state-level programs from which to
draw lessons.  For example, Iowa has had a program to improve
nitrogen management since 1982. In the Big Springs Basin in Iowa,
a combination of education, technical, and financial assistance
resulted in 52 percent of the producers reducing their
application of nitrogen fertilizer compared to the decade
earlier.  State wide demonstration projects were an integral part
of the program (National Research Council, 1993).  "The
experience in Iowa suggests that aggressive, coordinated efforts
can accelerate the voluntary adoption of improved farm management
techniques, at least when improved management results in19
financial as well as environmental benefits (National Research
Council, 1993, p. 170).
It is probable that there are systems and practices that belong
in this northwest cell, but that are not yet so perceived by
producers.  For example, there are numerous studies that suggest
that many producers do not view a reduction of chemical use or
other alternative agricultural practices as compatible with
profitability goals.  In a Wisconsin study, for example, 71
percent of the farmers felt their yields would drop if chemical
inputs were reduced.  And in an Iowa survey half the respondents
felt that the increased costs of tillage, labor, and machinery
would cancel any savings from reduced herbicide use (U.S.
Congress, 1990).  Not all of these impressions are accurate, and
thus a targeted and tailored educational/demonstration program
would seem to be needed to change perceptions and accelerate
adoption.
Lose-Lose
The southeast cell in Table 2 can be termed a "lose-lose"
situation as perceived by the farmer.  The producer has no
incentive to adopt this farming system or practice nor does he or
she perceive it to have positive effects on the environment. 
Assuming these perceptions are accurate, this situation is stable20
and no adoption will take place, nor should it.  No GSP payment
should go to these practices.
Win-Lose
The southwest cell on the other hand represents a situation where
the producer perceives a positive outcome from the adoption of
the system (or practice), but there is a negative public outcome
(win-lose).  The farming of fragile highly eroding soils,
intensive chemical use near waterways, concentrated livestock
production near waterways could be practices in the southwest
cell.  Clearly no GSP payment should be available for this system
(or practice).  However, changing behavior so that this system
(or practice) is abandoned is more problematic in a voluntary
program.  Such changes may require continual cost sharing
incentives--perhaps backed up with the threat of future
regulation.  Of course, cost sharing programs must be carefully
designed in these cases.  If too small, they will not elicit the
desired changes; if too large, they create windfalls for
producers and lead to public opposition.
Here too there may be a need for educational programs if the
producer fails to perceive a negative impact on the public
benefit--either from his or her farm or in general.  Thus, the
producer may perceive a system or practice belongs in the
northwest "win-win" cell when in actuality it is the southwest21
""win-lose" cell.  Some  extension agents have claimed success
with an educational technique that involves actually sampling the
runoff or leaching from a farm enterprise for contaminants and
sharing the results with the producer within the context of
overall pollution of nearby water so the producer will recognize
the farm's contribution to water quality degradation (Tompkins,
1994).
Lose-Win
The analysis of the northeast cell is similar to the southwest
cell.  Whereas the southwest cell requires a cost sharing
approach to have a producer replace a environmentally damaging
system with a more environmentally supportive one, the northeast
cell, involving encouraging a producer to adopt a practice that
may be perceived as harmful to his or her goals, but protective
of the environment (lose-win).  Such practices might include for
example the adoption of filter strips or the setting aside of
land for the protection of wildlife habitat.  Here again long
term cost sharing or other payments will be needed in a voluntary
GSP.
One approach currently being used in Wisconsin to get voluntary
adoption of wind erosion control practices that most likely fall
in the southwest cell is "The Conservation Credit Initiative". 
Producers in the Central Sands area receive a $3 to $5 credit per     
8However, property tax credits, like all permanent financial
entitlements, will be eventually capitalized into the value of
land, thus eventually reducing the intended incentive.
22
acre on their property tax bill for each acre voluntarily
enrolled in a Conservation Credit Program.  The program has also
been expanded to include Pepin County dairy producers for the
adoption of water quality protection practices.  The credits are
incentives to those who farm their own land, and the program has
positive attributes of rewarding good stewards, being locally
directed, and being flexible.
8 
Which Technologies Where?
As previously discussed, the determination of which technologies
and which farming systems and practices belong in which cell
requires a careful analysis that is unique to the particular
watershed, airshed, and farm in question.  However, the evidence
suggests that, for many, perhaps most situations, there are both
win-win systems (and not yet adopted) or that there are
unexploited opportunities to change lose-win situations into win-
win situations with modest public payments.  Furthermore,
foreseeable research results should expand such opportunities. 
However, success in a GSP program depends not only on the
accurate identification of those opportunities, but also on
overcoming other non-profitability barriers to participation in a
GSP.23
Non-Profitability Factors Influencing Participation in a GSP
There is considerably more known about which farming systems
should reduce environmental degradation, then there is known
about why individuals producers farm they way they do.  This
ignorance is partly due to inadequate research directed to the
question.  
However, another reason for this ignorance is the complexity of
the answer.  This complexity stems from the diversity of the
agriculture in the United States.  This diversity includes the
variation in soils, landscapes, climates, and hydrogeology in
which farming takes place; the variation in the type, size and
ownership of the farming enterprise; and the variation in the
socioeconomic motivations and characteristics of producers. 
There is also variation in institutional settings and variation
in the signals producers receive from markets, policies, and
information suppliers (Creason and Runge, 1992; Fletcher, 1986:
Soil and Water Conservation Society, 1993).
A recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment (U.S.
Congress,1990) provided a summary of the research on diffusion of
conservation innovations and the factors influencing producers'
decisions with respect to farming practices (See Table 3). 
Several of these findings appear to be particularly germane to
the successful participation of producers in a voluntary GSP,
particularly perceptions of the source and magnitude of24
environmental problems, attitudes  about the value of
environmental goals, and producer involvement in program design. 
The successful design of a voluntary GSP will depend on
understanding producers' motivations for adoption of appropriate
farming systems in these complex and heterogenous settings.
"No Problem on My Farm" 
One reason producers are unwilling to participate on
environmentally-oriented programs is that they fail to see that
they are part of a problem that requires remediation.  Several
studies suggest that while farmers are aware of water quality or
soil erosion problem as a serious national or local problem, they
tend to exempt their own operation as contributing to the
problem. While in some cases this exemption may be warranted,
studies indicate that many producers underestimate their actual
pollutant loadings to water or their actual soil erosion rates
(Bosch, et. al, 1992; Nowak, 1982; Napier, Camboni, and Thraen,
1986; Camboni, Napier, and Lovejoy, 1990: U.S. Congress, 1990). 
That is, there appears to be little correlation between the
physical characteristics of the producer's farm and his or her
perception of an environmental problem or choice of farming
practices (Nowak, 1987).     
9Abbreviated from Office of Technology Assessment Report, Beneath the Bottom
Line (1990), pp.  189-191.
25
Table 3.  Research Findings on the Diffusion of Conservation
Innovations
9
1. Farmers are a heterogeneous group with unequal abilities and
unequal access to information and resources for decisionmaking. 
Farmers vary in their objectives, level of awareness, use of
information, and willingness to take risks; factors strongly
influencing some farmers may have very little effect on others... 
2.  Farmers' decisions are based on their fundamental reasons for
farming; their objectives may not be clearly defined or articulated. 
Farmers' objectives include: making a satisfactory living (either as
an owner-operator, tenant, or employee); keeping a farm in operation
for family inheritance or other personal reason, perhaps while
working at an off-farm job; obtaining a satisfactory return on
investments in land, labor and equipment; obtaining tax benefits
from the farm; obtaining recreation or esthetics enjoyment from the
farm; or a combination of these.  
3.  Economic factors exert important, but not sole, influences on
farmer decisionmaking.  Economic factors are key in defining what is
financially possible for farmers, but a variety of personal,
cultural, and environmental factors also shape farmers'
decisionmaking....
4.  Farmers typically make production decisions within short time
frames, which discourages investments in resource protection
measures.  Farmers often are forced to make decisions within a
short-term, year-to-year planning horizon that can prevent them from
taking risks or making the most economically efficient decisions
over the longer term....groundwater contamination are more complex
than individual  BMPs (Best Management Practices) or technological
products.  Complexity of systems-oriented changes will slow their
adoption.
5.  Farmers make changes slowly.  The decision to change farming
practices requires a considerable degree of deliberation, and
maintaining new changes frequently necessitates on-farm
experimentation and adaptation beyond that conducted during initial
technology development....
6.  A farmer's innovation decision process consists of several
sequential states.  These proceed through: 1) knowledge,... 2)
persuasion,...3) decision,...4) implementation,  and 5)
confirmation....  Farmers need different kinds of information and
use different communication channels at each stage....
7.  Farmers adopt "preventive innovations"  more slowly than
"incremental innovations."  Agricultural innovations studied in most
diffusion research have been "incremental innovations, "  or ideas
adopted in the present (e.g. hybrid corn, commercial fertilizers) to
gain possible increases in value in the future....  "Preventive
innovations" are new ideas adopted in the present to avoid possible
loss in the future.... Adoption rates of preventive innovations
usually are slower than those for incremental innovations....26
(Table 3 Cont.) 
8.  Individual and farm characteristics appear to explain only 
a small portion of conservation adoption behavior; institutional
factors (e.g. farm programs, credit availability) probably are
highly influential.
9.  Studies on adoption of farm practices have rarely examined 
the physical settings of adoption decisions or the extent or
resource degradation as it relates to adoption of remedial farm
practices.
10.  Farmers tend to underestimate the severity of soil and 
water quality problems on their own farms.
11.  Farmers are most likely to adopt technologies with certain
characteristics.  Favored technologies are those that: 1) have
relative advantage over other technologies (e.g., lower costs,
higher yields); 2) are compatible with current management objectives
and practices; 3) are easy to implement; 4) are 
capable of being observed or demonstrated; and 5) are capable 
of being adopted on an incremental or partial basis....
12.  Decentralized information exchange among farmers promotes a
wider range of innovations that do more centralized diffusion
channels.  Diffusion research indicates that local social 
networks are more important in the dissemination of preventive
innovations that they are in incremental innovations....  
Farming changes to protect groundwater will likely be 
facilitated by decentralized farmer-to-farmer information
exchange....
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These findings appear to hold even when a program is accompanied
by cost-sharing incentives.  Hoban and Wimberly (1993) found that
one quarter of the nonparticipant in 21 Rural Clean Water Program
(RCWP) project areas did not participate despite cost sharing of
practices because they did not believe water pollution was a
problem on their own farm.  These perception existed despite the
deliberate selection of RCWP to areas having water quality
problems (Mass, Smolen, and Dressing, 1985).  Other factors cited
included six percent who said that cost shares were too low or
who cited other deterring financial factors.  Fifteen percent
resisted participation because changing practices would be too
much trouble, involve too much red tape or be too complicated. 
Ten percent had never heard of the program.
Similar studies have found that farmers failed to participate in
the Conservation Reserve Program because they believed they were
ineligible, when in fact their land would have qualified.  Esseks
and Kraft (1986) found in a national survey of farmers that the
most frequently cited reason (41 percent) for farmers not
entering a bid into the CRP was that they thought there land was
not eligible.  This figure compares with 25 percent who thought
the rental payments were inadequate and the 30 percent who
thought the ten year contract period was too long.
Lack of knowledge of a program and the lack of cost-sharing is
frequently cited in studies as reasons for nonparticipation in a28
program  (Ligon, et. al., 1988).  Ligon and her colleagues (1988)
study of Chesapeake Bay farmers found that small, part-time, or
absentee farmowners were less likely to know about the existence
and eligibility requirements of the Conservation Reserve Program. 
There is some evidence, however, that producers already enrolled
in commodity programs are more likely to be aware of new
programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (Camboni,
Napier, and Lovejoy, 1990). This correlation implies that, if
there is to be voluntary improvement in environmental quality
stemming from practices of nonparticipants in commodity programs,
then there need to be a specifically tailored outreach program to
this audience.  Commodity program participants such as grain
farmers appear to have more access to information on cost sharing
programs than, say, livestock producers.  If the target problem
is animal waste runoff, then specific information will need to be
targeted to livestock producers.
Esseks and Kraft (1990) as well as the National Research Council
(1993) recommended that these educational programs be modeled on
what they termed an "industrial marketing" approach that "sells"
a tailored  best management system by relating the system to the
goals and objectives of the "buyer" (i.e. farmer).  This selling
is accomplished by using techniques not unlike those used in
"Madison Avenue" advertising campaigns for normal consumer goods.
Targeted and tailored information is crucial for a voluntary29
program.  As Padgitt and Lasley (1990) note in writing about
conservation compliance "mass approaches and trickle down
education are not likely to meet the needs..." (p. 398).
Attitudes
Attitudes toward the environment in general can influence
adoption.  For example, Purvis, Hoehn and Sorenson (1989) found
that farmers who are concerned about the environment are likely
to set aside more of their eligible acreage in filter strips or
to require lower yearly payments for participation.  Farmers who
indicated they were not concerned about the environment would
require a yearly payment approximately $35 per acre higher than
those who consider environmental quality an important reason to
enter a filter strip program.
Similarly, Napier and Brown (1993) found that farmers who
believed that pesticides and fertilizers in groundwater posed a
threat to family health tended to perceive that groundwater
pollution was an important environmental issue.  They were also
more willing to "force" farmers with legislation to use
groundwater protection practices.  
Thus, it appears that a perception of a  problem is a logical
prerequisite to adoption of changed system of practices  (Norris,
1985; Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Napier and Forester, 1982; Ervin and30
Alexander, 1981; Hoover and Wiitala, 1980; Nowak, 1982).  Nowak
and Korsching (1983) as well as Bosch, et. al. (1992)  found that
there is a negative correlation between the perception of both
water quality and soil erosion problems and the years of
experience in farming.  The more experienced producers tend to
underestimate their contribution to an environmental  problem. 
Similarly, in a study of 570 North Carolina farmers, Anderson
(1988) found that full time farmers with more agrichemical
intensive operations expressed significantly less concern about
chemicals potential to harm wildlife than did those farmers who
had less intensive operations.  These findings are consistent
with some in Virginia (Halstead, Batie, and Kramer, 1988;
Halstead, Padgitt and Batie, 1990) and Iowa (Padgitt, 1987). 
However,in general, individual and farm characteristics explain
only a small portion of differences in adoption behavior (Napier
and Brown, 1993; U.S. Congress, 1990). 
Other studies have shown that the number of contacts producers
have with various sources of technical and education assistance
was positively related to accurate perceptions of erosion
problems (Choi and Coughenour, 1979; Hoban, 1990; Nowak and
Korsching, 1983; Ervin and Ervin, 1982).
These factors influencing producer decisions imply that a
targeted voluntary GSP will need to be accompanied with a
tailored educational component so that producers recognize the31
severity and nature of the environmental problem as well as their
contribution to it.  However,studies of environmental problems
show that environmental problems are unevenly located in various
regions and parts of regions throughout the nation.  If producers
are to recognize their contribution to an environmental pollution
problem, there needs to actually be a problem.  Broad general
assertions that imply all farms contribute to equally severe
environmental problems are not only inaccurate, they tend to
reinforce attitudes of "not on my farm".  Targeting to genuine
and more severe environmental  problems such as the loss of
important wildlife habitat, the extinction of endangered species,
the imperiling of human health or recreational benefits, or the
destruction of long term productivity will increase the
credibility of using voluntary technical and financial
assistance.
Producer Involvement
Even if a producer is aware of a problem, he or she must still
have a favorable attitude toward the proposed solution if they
are to voluntarily  adopt a new farming system or practice
(Lovejoy and Napier, 1986).  Some researchers argue that adoption
will be increased if there is producer involvement in both
problem definition and problem solution.  For example, J.C. van
Es (1982) notes:
This undoubtedly sounds trite, but soil and water
conservation programs have a history of defining a physical32
problem, developing a technological solution, and then
devising a way to have the solution implemented by the
farmers.  Heavy reliance on voluntary approaches will
require that farmers be involved much more actively in
problem definition and problem solution that has
traditionally been the case (p. 250).
Given the diversity of site-specific problems, failure to involve
producers will undermine cost-effective solutions.  Furthermore,
if producers assist in problem and definition, they are more
likely to carefully implement changes.  One outcome of producer
involvement, then, is reduced program implementation and
enforcement costs.  The involvement of producers is also
essential for tailored educational components that should
underlie a targeted voluntary GSP.
Can A Voluntary GSP Achieve Improved Environmental Quality?
Even if producers are involved, perceive a problem, and
participate in concentrated, tailored educational activities,
voluntary programs will not achieve improved environmental
quality by themselves, except perhaps in the win-win situations.
Many believe that voluntary programs alone, at least as currently
designed, will not accomplish all the desired environmental goals
desired (Batie, 1983; Buttel and Swanson, 1986; Harrington,
Krupnik, and Peskin, 1985; Hoban, 1990; Napier, 1987; Swanson,
Camboni, and Napier, 1986).  Epp and Shortle (1985) note that
voluntary actions for most environmental problems have not been
very successful. After a review of the Wisconsin Nonpoint Source33
Water Pollution Abatement Program, Konrad and his colleagues
(1985) conclude that "no voluntary program will achieve the
desired levels of control in all situations.  In those case,
regulatory mechanisms must be considered (1985. p. 61). 
Similarly, the Chesapeake Bay program review panel concluded that
voluntary incentives, at least as implemented in the past, have
been ineffective in achieving the program goals (Nonpoint Source
Evaluation Panel, 1990). Surveys also suggest that many farmers
want some coercion to penalize non-compliers with environmental
legislation  (Padgitt and Lasley, 1993), so that historical and
consistent "bad actors" are not rewarded for their behavior.
Harrington, Krupnick, and Peskin (1985) note that those
nonconservation, voluntary programs that have been successful in
the past share common elements. "The first condition is agreement
that the policy objective is a worthy one and that the action
sought will advance that objective.  The second is easily
observable noncompliance in order to create social pressures for
compliance.  The third is that the cost of a voluntary approach
should not greatly exceed the value of its private benefits.  The
fourth is a belief that failure of the approach will eventually
lead to mandatory action" (p. 28).  Thus, there may be a need for
a perceived threat of additional governmental action if the     
10For am interesting discussion on compliance see Esseks and
Kraft (1993).  Their research on midwestern producers suggests
that producers are more likely to expect detection when they are
not in compliance if they have relatively frequent contact with
the local USDA offices and if they also believe that monitoring
makes use of aerial photography.
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voluntary nonpoint pollution programs failed to achieve
satisfactory results.
10 
There appear to be few voluntary non-point programs which are
designed using these criteria for their success, in part because
many are based on earlier conservation programs characterized by
pursuit of farm income support goals (Batie, 1985).
Implications for a Green Support Program
What do we know about designing a voluntary GSP that improves
environmental quality?  For many farming situations appropriate
technologies and information exist to achieve more
"environmentally protecting" farming, but environmental problems
are unevenly distributed nationally as well as within watersheds
and airsheds.  Furthermore, successful voluntary programs tend to
occur where producers are aware of their contribution to an
environmental problem they believe is important, where the
benefits of participation are not swamped by the costs, where the
producers have assisted in program design, implementation, and
enforcement, where education programs are tailored to producer35
needs, and where an implicit or explicit threat of future
regulatory programs exist (National Research Council, 1993). 
These conclusions suggest some fundamental elements of a
voluntary GSP.  A voluntary GSP is more likely to be successful
if it reflects the national diversity of problems and farm
characteristics, that is, if it targets priority areas and
priority farms within these areas, and if it emphasizes tailored
site-specific planning processes with meaningful producer
involvement.
One Size Does Not Fit All
The lesson from the diversity of the problems, the landscape, the
farm enterprises, and the producers is: "One size does not fit
all."  Data on diversity and from the experience with other
programs such as the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments
(CZARA) suggest that a single comprehensive program that
specifies the adoption of specific practices for all farms would 
be ineffective and expensive.  There is a public payoff in
targeting to both "priority areas" and to "priority farms"--both
in reducing the cost of the program and in improving
environmental quality (National Research Council, 1993).  
Heimlich (1994) demonstrates the use of national data to focus
attention on certain problems in certain regions.  However, the36
national data is too aggregated to pinpoint precise watershed
problem areas for local planning purposes.  Nevertheless, there
is increasingly refined data available at the state level to
enable reasonably accurate identification of priority areas for a
targeted GSP as well as for the identification of polluting farm
enterprises within those priority areas.  This data is in need of
refinement (National Research Council, 1993), but such refinement
could come in response to a targeted, voluntary GSP.
The payoff to targeting is the acceleration of the adoption of
conservation systems in areas of most critical need, the
maintenance of long term agricultural productivity, the reduction
in off-site damages, and an increase in cost effectiveness.  In
addition, only those farmers with significant contributions to
environmental problems should be required to change their farming
systems.  By focusing on a priority area, the opportunity exists
to provide flexibility in program design, to include producers in
program design, and to strengthen the role of local and state
agencies in coordination with federal programs (Nielson, 1986). 
Equally important, is the ability provided by targeting to focus
on different problems in different areas.  Thus, in one region,
such as the watersheds influencing the quality of the Chesapeake
Bay, a major problem may be animal waste pollution.  The targeted
producer is then the livestock, poultry, or dairy producer.  In
other areas, such as the High Plains of Texas, the concern may be37
windblown dust and long term soil productivity.  The targeted
producer is then the crop producer.
Whole Farm System Planning
When reduced to its fundamentals, there are only three basic
choices for the design a GSP: (1) the identification of a
specific set of practices for each type of farm (i.e., design or
technology based standards), (2) the articulation of a tailored
site specific planning process, and (3) the specification of 
specific environmental quality goals (i.e., performance
standards).  The evidence concerning the factors that influence
participation in a GSP as well as the diversity of environmental
problems suggest that a voluntary GSP should focus on the
development of a tailored site specific planning process.  The
development of targeted farm system planning is also the approach
recommended by the National Research Council Committee that
authored the report, Soil and Water Quality: An Agenda for
Agriculture (1993). 
Whole farm planning can be simple, but they do involve examining
the whole farm as a system and changing how the producer gathers
information and makes decisions.  Plans, thus are information-
gathering, recommendation-building exercises rather then a
selection of management practices from a list of approved BMPs. 
Plans should be flexible and coordinate with individual38
enterprises characteristics.  Integrated farm plans should focus
on improving the way information is gathered and used by the
producer to make farm management decisions.  Indeed, standards
such as record keeping or certification requirements intended to
improve the flow of information may be far more valuable than
technology-based standards (Batie and Cox, 1994).
Clearly, a voluntary GSP that relies on whole farm system
planning cannot involve all farms everywhere; there are not
enough resources to accomplish the job, nor is it necessary to do
so.  The importance of targeting to priority areas and farms
within these areas is again emphasized.
There are some approximate models to use in developing this
approach.  For example, Wisconsin legislature created and funded
the Wisconsin Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Abatement Program
in 1978.  The Wisconsin program concentrates on hydrological
units called priority watersheds and areas within these
watersheds termed priority management areas. Konrad, Baumann, and
Bergquist (1985) describe this program.  They note that six
criteria are used to select the priority areas:  (1) the severity
of the water quality problem, (2) the magnitude of the loadings
and the potential to reduce the loadings significantly, (3)
landowners willingness to participate, (4) the ability and
willingness of local agencies to assist the program, (5) and the
capability of the local agencies to control pollution through the39
necessary enactments of local ordinances, (6) the potential
public benefits and use from the proposed project.  The selection
process is quite specific and includes numerical rankings of
watersheds.  The priority watershed plan then has two parts: a
technical assessment and an implementation strategy that outlines
the process of achieving project objectives.  These two parts are
described in Table 4. 
The National Research Council Report (1993) also provides a
detailed discussion of the Narrows Creek Middle Baraboo Priority
Watershed Project which is part of this Wisconsin program.
Dairying is the major activity in this watershed and the project
was used to reach four priorities: (1) the appropriate use of
soil tests, (2) nitrogen crediting from legumes, (3) nitrogen
crediting from manures, and (4) construction of manure storage
structures.  Each of the three regions within the watershed
required a different emphasis among the four general priorities
(National Research Council, 1993, pp 164-166).  Thus, the
Wisconsin program contains many of the targeting, information-
gathering, planning, and producer involvement elements discussed
earlier.     
11Abbreviated from John G. Konrad, James G. Baumann, and Susan E.
Bergquist, (1985).
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Table 4.  The Wisconsin Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Abatement
Program
11
Selection of Priority Watersheds
Selection of priority watersheds is a four step process
that involves the numerical ranking of watershed
following evaluation by the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), review and recommendation by regional
committees, the establishment of a list of 15 to 20
watersheds by a committee with various agency and
interest group representation, and final selection of
projects by the DNR.
Project Objectives
Selection of a priority watershed project is followed
by an eight to nine year planning and implementation
process.  An Implementation plan is prepared based on a
detailed inventory and assessment of critical source
areas and the project's water quality objectives.
The priority watershed plan has two parts:
Part I.  Part I is the technical assessment and the
setting of the watershed project goals by (a) assessing
water quality problems and objectives, (b) Identifying
significant nonpoint sources, (c) identifying water
quality improvements that can reasonable be achieved
through nonpoint pollution controls, and (d)
identifying management needs.
Part II.  Part II is the implementation strategy that
outlines the process for achieving project objectives. 
It identifies (a) the tasks necessary to accomplish the
management needs identified in Part I, (b) the agencies
responsible for carrying out those tasks, (c) the time
frame, (d) the staff resources needs, (e) the cost
share dollars need to implement the recommended
nonpoint source  control practices. 
Agreements
Following approval of a priority watershed plan, there
is a three year period during which landowners and
municipalities can sign cost share agreements for the
design and installation of BMPs.  Installation of BMPs
must take place within five years of the date the cost
share agreement is signed.  The BMPs must be maintained
for 10 to 20 years.  Failure to do so is a breach of
contract and requires repayment of the cost share funds
received.41
Summary
This review suggests that there is both technology and
information available to develop a voluntary and targeted GSP
that is dedicated to improving environmental quality as it
relates to agriculture.  However, the elements of such a program
are complex and require understanding of both the data on the
location, type and magnitude of the problem as well as the
diverse motivations of the nation's agricultural producers. 
However, the producers involved in a GSP oriented to
environmental improvement may not be the same producers currently
participating in agricultural commodity programs.
This review further suggests that elements of a successful,
voluntary  GSP include (a) targeting to priority areas and farms
within these areas, (b) tailored and targeted educational
programs, (c) whole farm system planning  (e) emphasis on
information gathering and use (f) producer involvement in the
design and implementation of the program and plan, (g)
transitional cost-sharing for some practices and longer term cost
sharing for other practices as part of a system, (h) an explicit
or implicit threat of future mandatory programs should voluntary
programs fail to achieve public goals.
What is clear is that improvement of nonpoint pollution will
require changing the way we have approached the problem in the42
past.  We know enough to do better, to be more cost effective,
and for many farms, still preserve the profitability of farming.
At the same time, we should be realistic about how much a
targeted, voluntary GSP program can reasonably be expected to
accomplish.  Etzioni (1994) in an editorial on social programs
makes some comments equally germane to conservation programs.
On one level, both from personal experience and from
numerous studies, we know that it is extraordinary difficult
to change habits, personality traits, culture, and social
institutions....  Let us...dedicate our efforts to effective
but clearly delineated projects...  This humbler approach is
likely to have a very attractive side effect: it may enhance
public willingness to pay for such projects and may also
restore public trust in our leaders and institutions (pp.
15-16).
Still, we know enough to improve the design of conservation
programs, and improved information will be forthcoming that will
allow even further refinement of such programs.  Whether a
voluntary GSP program will reach its full potential will depend
on both creativity in using such information and public resolve
to implement the program as designed (Hoban, 1990).43
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